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The  global  financial  crisis  forcefully  highlighted  the  importance  of  developing 
mechanisms to curb the effects of large and volatile capital inflows on growth and 
financial  stability  in  developing  countries.  It  led  the  IMF  to  reconsider  its  long-
standing rejection of capital controls. This paper explores the analytical framework 
underlying  the  IMF’s  new  position,  arguing  that  its  sequencing  strategy  offers  a 
formulaic  solution  that  neglects  the  institutional  make-up  of  money  and  currency 
markets,  is  asymmetric  in  its  emphasis  on  the  upturn  of  the  liquidity  cycle  and 
sanctions capital-controls only as a last-resort solution. The new approach can have 
perverse impacts, increasing vulnerability where banks play an important role in the 
intermediation of capital inflows. The paper offers alternative policy solutions that 
focus on realigning bank incentives towards longer horizons and sustainable growth 
models,  combining  carefully  designed  central  bank  liquidity  strategies  and 
institutional changes in the banking sector.  
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1.  Introduction 
The global financial crisis has turned capital account management into an increasingly 
contested terrain. Two recent events highlight how important this policy debate is for 
developing countries. The post Lehman Brothers contagion called into question the 
optimism of the ‗decoupling hypothesis‘ (Walti, 2009) and its benign portrayal of 
developing countries‘ integration in global financial markets.  Instead, it highlighted 
that  capital  flows,  and  no  longer  trade  relationships,  have  become  the  ‗principal 
conduit for the transmission of global shocks‘ (IMF, 2010:3). Furthermore, the return 
of risk appetite in international financial markets since April 2009, prompted by easy 
liquidity conditions in high income countries, has been accompanied by increasing 
concerns  that  capital  flows  could  undermine  national  development  strategies.  For 
instance,  China  identified  dollar-funded  carry  trades,  i.e.  borrowing  in  dollars  to 
invest in domestic asset markets, as the most important policy challenge in 2010 (Tett 
and Garnham, 2010), a view shared by several emerging markets that imposed or 
further tightened capital controls throughout 2010 (Brazil, South Korea, Indonesia, 
Thailand). Thus it is argued in international currency debates that large capital inflows 
trigger excessive currency interventions and capital controls that effectively amount to 
gaining  ‗unfair‘  competitive  advantage.  High  income  countries  in  turn  expressed 
concerns that reserve accumulation in developing countries reproduced the pre-2007 
vulnerabilities by aggravating global imbalances (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009).  
In  response,  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  abandoned  its  much 
criticized rejection of capital controls, instead recognizing the need to strengthen the 
theoretical foundations and institutional mechanisms for addressing large and volatile 
capital flows (IMF, 2010). A first step in the development of an institutional view 
came with Ostry et al.‘s (2010) analytical framework that endorses temporary capital   3 
controls once other policy options are exhausted. The sequencing strategy is expected 
to set the conceptual framework for a systematic discussion and reform of the IMF‘s 
policy  advice on capital  inflows  (IMF, 2010).  It is  thus  important  to  assess what 
benefits and challenges this new policy agenda holds for developing countries, and 
ask whether a radically different approach is necessary. 
Eastern Europe, it will be argued, can provide interesting answers for several 
reasons. Like many developing countries, it has open capital accounts, further space 
for  financial  deepening  and  a  substantial  presence  of  global  banks  in  domestic 
banking systems. Unlike its peers however, membership (ambitions) of the European 
Union reduce the possibilities of imposing capital controls, so that capital account 
management in the region reveals neatly the dilemmas raised by the IMF‘s vision of 
capital controls as a last resort measure. Thirdly, Eastern Europe, the region worst 
affected by the global crisis, offers a paradigmatic example of the key role that capital 
flows play in the transmission of global shocks. While initially weathering well the 
turmoil in developed financial markets, the post Lehman deleveraging suddenly faced 
the region with a twin crisis scenario (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999): a currency and 
banking  crisis  in  the  aftermath  of  a  period  of  fast  growth  financed  by  foreign 
borrowing through banking sectors, accompanied by overvalued exchange rates and 
asset bubbles.  
Indeed, the paper will argue, Eastern Europe offers an analytically rich terrain 
for reflecting on the link between the changing  models of banking in  developing 
countries,  policy  room  for  manoeuvre  in  tackling  capital  inflows  and  the  growth 
models enabled by distinct policy choices. The paper is structured as follows. The 
first part explores the nuanced theoretical treatment of capital inflows in developing 
countries and the conceptual innovations arising from analytical focus on financial   4 
globalization. It then draws on Eastern Europe‘s crisis in the context of international 
(particularly East Asian) experience with large capital inflows to critically assess the 
strength and weaknesses of the IMF‘s analytical framework. The paper argues that the 
IMF‘s  sequencing  strategies  can  have  perverse  effects  where  banks  play  multiple 
roles in the intermediation of capital inflows. It further asks what policy measures 
could  realign  banks‘  system  of  incentives  aside  from  Shin‘s  (2010)  persuasive 
advocacy of macroprudential policies? 
 
2.  Capital controls: the context 
The recent financial crisis saw developing countries portray currency management 
and  capital  controls  as  legitimate  policy  choices  for  two  related  reasons:  a  more 
nuanced theoretical position towards the benefits of capital account liberalization and 
the increasingly complex and interconnected nature of currency markets.  
Since  the  1980s,  free  capital  movements  were  advocated  as  a  solution  to 
capital-constrained countries. Capital flows, attracted by higher rates of return, would 
improve  the  allocation  of  resources  and  allow  countries  to  tap  savings  surpluses 
elsewhere, thus enhancing welfare by intertemporal smoothing of consumption and 
increased investment (Fischer, 1998). The underlying theoretical framework drew on 
three  normative  assumptions:  no  overshooting,  no  reversals  and  no  speculation. 
Surplus savings will flow to countries with low capital/labour ratios until profitable 
investment opportunities are exhausted, so that there cannot be ‗excessive‘ inflows or 
fast  reversals.  The  third  assumption  dovetailed  with  the  dominant  theoretical 
interpretation of short-run exchange rate movements, the uncovered interest parity 
(UIP) condition: a country‘s higher interest rates reflect expectations that its currency   5 
will  depreciate  (Grenville,  2008).  Gains  from  interest  rate  differentials  would  be 
wiped out by exchange rate movements. 
Whereas the benefits of unfettered capital inflows became the cornerstone of 
international  policy  advocacy  during  the  1980s,  developing  countries‘  experience 
increasingly  questioned  this  benign  view.  Contrary  to  predictions,  East  Asian 
countries registered inflows of a magnitude and volatility difficult to explain through 
standard theories. The large inflows before and the sharp decline after the 1997 crisis 
led to an increasingly nuanced analysis: while benefits should not be discarded, large 
and cyclical capital inflows could increase financial fragility (Schadler, 2008). The 
concept of absorptive capacity gained theoretical relevance: structural features of the 
economy  determined  a  threshold  beyond  which  capital  inflows  could  aggravate 
consumption booms and/or spill over into asset bubbles (Kawai and Takagi, 2008). 
The idea of a ‗threshold‘ also implied a role for policy. Yet, as Rodrik (1998) put it, 
every  crisis  with  regional/global  consequences  only  revealed  that  previous 
generations  of  economic models,  and by implication the policy  recommendations, 
were inadequate. Indeed, models of the 1980s debt crisis identified sovereign over-
borrowing  as  cause  and  prescribed  fiscal  rectitude  as  solution  to  capital  account 
difficulties.  In  the  aftermath  of  the  East  Asian  and  Russian  crisis,  policy  advice 
focused on corner solutions (fixed or full flexibility) for exchange rate management to 
address  the  vulnerability  of  soft-pegs  to  speculative  attacks  (IEO,  2007). 
Nevertheless, international policy advice continued to insist that the benefits of capital 
inflows  outweighed  the  risks,  particularly  since  capital  controls  decisions  are 
inevitably political (Rogoff, 2002). According to this view, capital controls would 
encourage politicians to become more interventionist and reverse the gains made with   6 
market-driven economic processes. As a consequence, before the 2008  crisis, few 
developing countries openly questioned the wisdom of liberalized capital flows. 
However,  structural  changes  in  currency  markets  set  the  stage  for  a  more 
contested approach. As the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Triennial Survey 
of Foreign exchange and Derivatives Market Activity (2007, 2010) documented the 
rapid expansion in currency trading, the theoretical and policy importance of cross-
currency  investment  strategies  (known  as  carry  trades)  became  increasingly 
recognized.  A  carry-trade  position  involves  leveraged  borrowing  in  low-yielding 
currencies to fund placements in high  yielding currencies (Galati  et  al., 2007). In 
theoretical  terms,  carry-trade  activity  involves  a  direct  violation  of  the  dominant 
explanation for short-term currency movements, the UIP condition commonly used in 
open economy models (Bursnide et al., 2007; Brunnermeier et al., 2008). In policy 
terms, pervasive carry trade activity has drawn theoretical attention to the following 
issues:  
a)  Global  liquidity  -  whereas  early  research  approached  carry  trades  as  foreign 
exchange transactions, it is increasingly recognized that carry trades should be set 
in the context of global liquidity conditions  (Hattori and Shin, 2009) and that 
capital flows cycles are global in nature (IMF, 2010). As discussions of how to 
define and measure global liquidity gather pace, the IMF (2010) links it to policy 
choices in key financial centers: low interest rates and abundant liquidity in high 
income countries play a global ‗push‘ role for capital flows. In turn developing 
countries with open capital account policies are typically targets of carry flows.  
b)  Destabilizing  potential  -  the  profitability  of  carry  trade  activity  rests  on  two 
conditions: that interest rate differentials remain attractive, and that exchange rates 
do not move to offset yield advantage. The ability to rapidly close positions in   7 
response  to  changing  conditions  is  essential,  so  that  volatility  is  a  salient 
characteristic of carry trade activity. Carry trades can unwind quickly and trigger 
currency crashes, either because of funding constraints (Brunnermeier et al., 2008) 
or  changes  in  expectations  of  exchange  rate  movements.  Unlike  Friedman‘s 
(1953)  scenario  where  speculative  activity  is  inherently  stabilizing  because 
speculators trigger faster adjustments to fundamentals, carry trade activity can be 
destabilizing, particularly if accompanied by strategic complementarity between 
carry trade players that expands the size of carry trade positions (Plantin and Shin, 
2011).  
c)  Actors and strategies of implementation - the two main strategies in developing 
countries, according to Galati et al. (2007), involve either exchanging borrowed 
funds in the spot (target) currency market or entering derivative contracts. The 
target currency is placed in liquid, short-term assets: sovereign debt instruments, 
equities,  bank  deposits.  The  key  actors  are  global  financial  institutions,  either 
banks  or  institutions  in  the  shadow  banking  sector  with  access  to  wholesale 
funding (Pozsar et al., 2010). In target markets (of developing countries), banks 
can act as direct carry trade players through proprietary trading desks or indirectly 
as counterparts in spot or derivative segments of currency markets (typically to 
provide  domestic  liquidity).  Banking  activity  thus  moves  away  from  the 
traditional intermediation of surplus funds to multilayered models and strategies. 
d)  Interconnectedness  and  vulnerability  -  the  strategies  and  actors  involved  in 
cross-border capital flows suggest that the changing nature of banking activity is 
crucial for developing countries. It links exposure to global liquidity shocks to the 
presence of global banks in domestic banking systems and non-resident investors 
in  domestic  asset  markets.  It  thus  re-draws  the  boundaries  of  the  relationship   8 
between policy autonomy in target countries, financial intermediaries and interest 
rate decisions in funding currency countries. 
For these reasons macroeconomic trends in developing countries can no longer be 
considered in isolation from global capital cycles. Kohler (2009) provides a powerful 
example in answering the question of what, if anything, distinguishes this crisis from 
previous crisis with global consequences (the 1997 Asian and 1998 Russian crisis)? 
The crucial difference lays in exchange rate trends. The Lehman collapse produced 
contagion effects that did not discriminate according to underlying macroeconomic 
conditions:  global  deleveraging  triggered  sharp  depreciations  across  developing 
countries. Unlike in previous episodes, these were followed by sharp reversals, which 
Kohler  (2009)  interprets  as  evidence  of  the  increasing  importance  of  interest  rate 
differentials when unconventional monetary policy in high income countries restored 
global liquidity after April 2009.  
Indeed, even Eastern Europe has seen currency trends tracking closely non 
European carry-trade targets such as the Brazilian Real or the Thai Baht (see Figure 
1), a trend somewhat muted by strains in European sovereign debt markets during 
2010.  Romania  alone  in  Eastern  Europe  failed  to  follow  this  trend  of  currency 
strengthening. The region‘s success in overcoming its subprime moment (September 
2008 to April 2009) has been explained differently, from the IMF‘s massive presence 
in the region that restored policy credibility (IMF, 2009), to increasing risk appetite 
accompanying accommodative monetary policies in high income countries (Gabor, 
2010) or high levels of foreign ownership in the banking sector that secured Western 
banks‘ commitment to maintain cross-border loans (Andersen, 2009; Herrmann and 
Mihaljek, 2010).    9 
Figure 1 Nominal exchange rate trends, 2007=100, Eastern Europe (EENMS) vs. non European 
carry trade targets (against EUR) 
 
Source: data from the European Central Bank. For Eastern Europe: Romanian leu, Hungarian 
forint, Polish zloty, Czech koruna. For non-European targets: Brazilian real, New Zealand 
dollar, Australian dollar, Singapore dollar, Thai baht. 
 
Such  exchange  rate  trends  have  underpinned  increasingly  diverse  and  contentious 
policy  responses  in  developing  countries,  lending  weight  to  calls  for  the  IMF  to 
develop  an institutional  view that can  guide policy decisions  without  becoming a 
‗blueprint‘ that neglects country circumstances.  
 
3.  The IMF’s view of capital account management 
The changes in the IMF‘s position signal the end of a long-standing reluctance to 
endorse  capital  controls  (see  Ostry  et  al.,  2010;  IMF,  2010).  According  to  this 
framework, where policy makers:  
1)  consider that there is no room for additional exchange rate appreciation, 
2)  cannot implement further monetary easing,    10 
3)  have  little  prudential  concerns  to  justify  the  continuous  accumulation  of 
foreign reserves and  
4)  no more room for further sterilizations  
5)  or fiscal tightening  
6)  then capital controls become a legitimate response (capital controls are also 
justified  once  prudential  regulation  to  contain  credit  booms  becomes 
inefficient). However, the IMF (2010) warns, restrictions on capital inflows 
or outflows, particularly targeting short-term capital inflows, can produce 
ambiguous outcomes: shifts in the maturity structure towards longer-term 
inflows but no sizeable reduction in inflows. A careful design would be 
required to strengthen enforcement capacity and address financial markets‘ 
ability to innovate and circumvent regulations. 
 
3.1 Step 1: Allow exchange rate to appreciate to levels consistent with fundamentals 
The first policy question to consider in addressing large capital inflows is whether, 
and  by  how  much,  exchange  rates  deviate  from  fundamental  values.  The  IMF‘s 
recommendation is straightforward: undervaluation requires no policy action, since 
capital inflows ensure realignment to equilibrium. Policy actions are warranted where 
exchange rate rise above equilibrium levels. Yet in policy practice this first step is far 
more complex  for methodological and theoretical  reasons.  Reliable estimations of 
misalignment  are  difficult  to  produce,  while  the  analytical  frameworks  typically 
deployed  cannot  account  for  the  complexity  of  factors  associated  with  currency 
trading (global liquidity, actors and strategies, interconnectedness). 
Traditionally,  misalignment  was  measured  through  the  Purchasing  Power 
Parity approach: a long-run equilibrium value based on equal prices in a common   11 
currency. Yet PPP‘s static equilibrium assumptions and empirical evidence of short-
term volatility (Rogoff, 1996) saw theoretical innovations that allowed equilibrium 
exchange rates to change with fundamentals. An increasingly popular set of models, 
used  by  the  IMF  for  exchange  rate  surveillance,  describes  equilibrium  through  a 
macroeconomic  balance  (Cline  and  Williamson,  2010).  Fundamentals  include  an 
‗underlying‘  capital  account  (presuming  a  sustainable  long-run  level),  full-
employment variables and, where appropriate, productivity growth differentials (the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect
1). However, this class of models offers no analytical lenses 
to investigate the possibility and impact of carry trade activity. Interest rates are 
assumed to remain at long-run equilibrium level, while substantial variation in short-
term fundamentals is assumed away (IEO, 2007). 
 A related set of models, most notably the Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange 
rate (BEER), distinguishes between short-run dynamics and long-term fundamentals. 
Yet possible policy concerns with drivers of short -term currency trading cannot be 
analytically  integrated  because  sh ort-term  exchange  rate  dynamics  are  modelled 
through the UIP (appended with a risk premium), which carry trade activity directly 
violates.  Furthermore,  BEER  crucially  require  exchange  rates  to  remain  ‗in 
equilibrium over the period of estimation‘ (on average), an assumption  with  little 
empirical  support  (Cline  and  Williamson,  2010:2).  Thus,  empirical  estimations  of 
misalignment  are  subject  to  considerable  uncertainty,  as  different  methodological 
choices yield widely ranging and at times opposite measures of misalignment (IEO, 
2007)  particularly  in  developing  countries  with  rapidly  changing  underlying 
conditions (Dunaway and Li, 2005).  
In  other  words,  advances  in  the  theoretical  explanations  of  equilibrium 
exchange  rates  cannot  capture  the  increasing  complexity  of  currency  trading  in   12 
developing countries. The importance of this omission cannot be understated, as the 
BIS Triennial surveys of broad regional patterns suggests (see Table 1). Before the 
crisis (the April 2007 survey), currency trading in Eastern Europe concentrated on the 
derivative  segment,  in  contrast  to  other  emerging  markets  dominated  by  spot 
transactions (with larger shares for Brazil and China). Across the region, derivative 
trading overwhelmingly involved non-resident players, typically non-resident banks. 
In contrast, local players dominated the derivative segment in Brazil, South Korea and 
China (due to regulatory restrictions). The distinction also holds for maturity profiles: 
in Eastern Europe, the dominance of short-term instruments suggests that derivatives 
funded short-term currency positions rather than hedge export activity. The crisis and 
then the return of risk appetite triggered important changes, indicating that currency 
trading in emerging markets is converging towards the profile of Eastern Europe‘s 
countries. Whereas the effects of deleveraging can be traced in currency markets of 
Eastern European countries, with contractions (Hungary, Poland, Russia) or sluggish 
growth  (Czech  Republic,  Romania),  high  yielding  currencies  in  Latin  America  or 
Asia attracted far higher interest. The currency market in Brazil tripled in volume 
within three years and more than quadrupled in Turkey, driven by a fast growth in 
derivatives  and  non-resident  short-term  positions.  Such  dynamics  set  into  context 
Brazil‘s concerns with currency appreciation, and Turkey‘s decision to cut interest 
rates despite clear signs of an overheating economy at the end of 2010. 
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million USD)  
Derivatives  
(share of                               of which non- 
total trading)                       residents           
Instruments with 
maturity <7days 
   2007  2010  2007  2010  2007  2010  2007  2010 
Brazil  5,456    14,094   7%  38%  33%  66%  27%  39% 
China   9,288    19,774   10%  56%  0%  10%  49%  64% 
Korea   33,396    43,842  48%  58%  15%  31%  34%  47% 
Turkey  3,362    16,817   77%  67%  89%  88%  58%  65% 
Bulgaria  532         866   35%  31%  82%  82%  83%  71% 
Cz. Republic  4,947      5,110   72%  79%  83%  78%  78%  84% 
Estonia  1,251      1,059   85%  92%  98%  98%  84%  94% 
Hungary  6,715      4,196   67%  82%  87%  66%  78%  65% 
Latvia  2,589      2,226   68%  65%  82%  88%  95%  95% 
Lithuania  963      1,154   31%  77%  89%  93%  60%  95% 
Poland  8,813      7,847   73%  75%  83%  75%  77%  82% 
Romania  2510      3,169   60%  61%  90%  85%  81%  79% 
Russia  50,173    41,658   32%  46%  60%  54%  97%  97% 
Source: own computation from BIS (2007, 2010) 
 
Given such trends, how significant is the theoretical omission or carry-trade activity? 
What are the dangers of failing to recognize overvalued levels? The development 
approach to currency management suggests that exchange rates play an important role 
in the nature and sustainability of growth regimes (Williamson, 2003). Undervalued 
currencies  enable  investment-led  growth  models  (Gala,  2008),  contributing  to  the 
development  of  the  tradable  sector  (Rodrik,  2008).  East  Asian  countries  are  the 
typical example cited in the literature for such a developmental approach to currency 
management (Fabrizio et al, 2009). In turn, overvalued currencies underpin episodes 
of consumption-led growth and growing current account deficits, financed by short-
term debt. The associated volatility of capital inflows has further negative effects on 
fixed capital formation of private firms (Demir, 2009).  
Historically,  Latin  American  countries  in  the  1990s  (Brazil,  Argentina, 
Mexico),  East  Asian  countries  for  several  years  before  1997  and  Eastern  Europe   14 
before 2008 (Romania, the Baltic States, Hungary) followed this growth model, with 
the associated vulnerabilities to balance of payment crisis (Fabrizio et al, 2009).   
Indeed, Eastern Europe‘s short-term foreign borrowing highlights the dangerous 
nexus of overvalued exchange rates, credit booms and currency mismatches (Gabor, 
2010).  Similar  to  high  income  countries,  overextended  households  played  an 
important role in deepening exposure (Claessens et al, 2010). By September 2008, 
most  banking  systems  in  the  region  (Latvia,  Estonia,  Lithuania,  Hungary,  and 
Romania) had over half of outstanding housing and consumption loans denominated 
in foreign currency, typically Euros or Swiss Francs. Rosenberg and Tirpak (2008) 
found that the interest rate differential between local and foreign currency loans was 
an important driver of foreign currency borrowing in Eastern Europe. Foreign-owned 
banks  raised  wholesale  liquidity  in  short-term  international  money  markets  and 
addressed the maturity mismatches involved in this form of carry trade by transferring 
exchange rate risks to households. Households accepted the risks for reasons similar 
to subprime borrowers in the US mortgage market: a historical trend of exchange rate 
appreciation grounded expectations that exchange rates would continue to strengthen 
(Gabor,  2010).  The  range  of  regulatory  measures  to  address  the  building  credit 
bubbles remained narrow in the run-up to the 2008 crisis. With no ceiling on banks‘ 
currency exposure and in the absence of other capital controls, Rosenberg and Tirpak 
(2008) concluded, Eastern Europe suggests that regulatory measures will be ‗largely 
ineffective‘, more so if borrowing switches to non-resident financial institutions. 
In  sum,  with  large  capital  inflows  fuelling  credit  booms  and  ineffective 
microprudential regulation, Ostry et al (2010) identify two policy avenues:  monetary 
easing or direct interventions in currency markets. 
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3.2 Step 2: Pre-empting capital inflows through monetary policy 
The developmental approach to exchange rates stands in opposition to the prevailing 
view of how to conduct macroeconomic policy in both high income and developing 
countries.  According  to  this  New  Consensus,  economic  stability  is  best  achieved 
where developing countries target price stability within the framework of an inflation 
targeting regime and allow markets to set exchange rates: the credibility of a well-
performing  inflation  targeting  regime  would  avoid  swings  in  investor  sentiment 
(Taylor, 2000). Thus, the literature on optimal monetary policy models exchange rate 
movements through the UIP condition (Clarida et al, 2001). In contrast, the literature 
on capital account management increasingly accepts that carry trade activity is one 
key constraint to monetary policy in developing countries with open capital markets 
(Shin, 2010). 
Thus,  the  one  instrument  (interest  rate)/one  objective  (price  stability) 
framework  underlying  New  Consensus  models  confronts  central  banks  with  a 
conundrum:  how  to  cool  an  economy  overheated  by  large  capital  inflows?    The 
inflation  targeting  rule  recommends  interest  rate  increases  to  rein  in  demand 
pressures, yet larger yield differentials stimulate greater carry trade inflows, exchange 
rate  strengthening  and  looser  domestic  financial  conditions  (Shin,  2010).  For 
example, the turn to tightening in Eastern Europe before September 2008 (see Figure 
2)  that  sought  to  curb  overheating  instead  triggered  further  exchange  rate 
appreciations and perversely encouraged foreign currency borrowing.  
Lehman‘s  collapse further exposed the opposite dilemma:  the responses  to 
downturns in global liquidity cycles. Concerned with currency crisis and the impact 
on banks‘ heavily Euroized balance sheets (and thus a banking crisis), central banks in 
countries  with  high  exposure  to  carry  trade  activity  (Romania,  Hungary,  Latvia)   16 
hesitated to ease financing conditions as peers in high income countries did. In the 
trade-off between economic growth and financial stability, central banks prioritized 
the  latter,  tying  interest  rate  decisions  into  exchange  rate  stability.  The  IMF‘s 
conditionality  endorsed  this  approach  (Cordero,  2009).  Instead  of  nominal 
devaluations, the usual method for addressing balance of payment crisis, the Fund 
advised  adjustment  in  factor  prices  (wage  contractions),  monetary  and  fiscal 
tightening. The IMF crisis policies thus retained historical asymmetries, forcing the 
burden of adjustment on borrowing countries. 
 











Source: data from central bank websites 
 
Thus, despite pervasive deflationary forces, Eastern European central banks only set 
to  gradually  ease  monetary  policy  when  risk  appetite  returned  in  international 
financial markets after April 2009. This reaction adds a political economy dimension 
to what Plantin and Shin (2011) termed the perverse interaction between carry trade 
inflows  and  monetary  policy:  crisis  makes  the  distributional  consequences  of   17 
monetary policy decisions more apparent and thus politically contentious (Goodhart, 
2010).  For  instance,  since  June  2010  Hungary  has  experienced  an  open  conflict 
between government  and central bank over interest rate decisions. The Hungarian 
government portrayed the central bank‘s refusal to lower interest rates further as a 
decisive  intervention  in  the  distribution  of  wealth,  obstructing  growth  and 
employment creation in order to protect banking sector profits. 
 Given  such  pervasive  constraints  to  the  deployment  of  the  central  bank‘s 
interest rate, the alternative is direct interventions on currency markets. Indeed, Levy-
Yeyati  and  Sturzenegger  (2006)  contrasted  the  growing  preference  for  inflation 
targeting with a pervasive ‗fear of floating‘ across developing countries before the 
2008 crisis. In other words, central banks intervened in currency markets on a more 
sustained basis than the de jure classification of exchange rate regimes suggested. The 
2008  global  deleveraging  and  then  the  upturn  in  the  capital  flows  cycle  further 
reinforced this tendency. 
 
3.3  Step  3:  Interventions  in  currency  markets  -  when  is  reserve  accumulation 
desirable? 
The IMF‘s sequencing strategy suggests that reserve accumulation is desirable for 
precautionary  purposes  and  less  so  if  driven  by  mercantilist  concerns  with 
competitiveness.  For policy purposes  however,  a neat  separation between the two 
crucially  depends  on  assumptions  about  optimal  reserves  levels.  For  instance, 
Aizenman and Lee (2007) interpreted Asian countries‘ rapid growth in reserves after 
1997  as  evidence  of  policy  learning  about  exposure  to  overheating  rather  than 
competitive currency manipulation.    18 
Because holding reserves is costly in both economic and social terms (Rodrik, 
2006), the policy question that arises is how much reserves to accumulate or to what 
level  are  precautionary  concerns  justified?  Traditionally,  the  adequacy  of  reserve 
levels was assessed in relationship to current account dynamics, with a rule of thumb 
that reserves  should  cover at least  3 months  of imports. However,  Rodrik (2006) 
noted, the liberalization of capital flows changed the metric to financial magnitudes, 
triggering a secular growth in reserve holdings reflecting the increased frequency of 
sudden stops associated with financial globalization (Cline and Williamson, 2010) 
and the post-Asian crisis reluctance to rely on IMF resources. The threat of sudden 
stops instated the Guidotti-Greenspan rule of thumb: a ratio of reserves to short-term 
external debt that indicates ability to finance all debt due throughout the year. Yet 
there is little consensus on how much is too much. Some interpret Guidotti-Greenspan 
ratios  comfortably  exceeding  unity  as  evidence  of  ‗excessive‘  reserves  driven  by 
mercantilist intentions, as in the case of most East Asian countries (Park and Estrada, 
2009).  A  more  nuanced  position  suggested  combining  rules  of  thumbs  and 
econometric assessments with analytical foundations that take into account economic 
fundamentals, the composition of short-term debt and exchange rate regimes (Jeanne 
and Ranciere, 2006). Nevertheless, these estimations suffer from the conceptual and 
methodological  difficulties  described  earlier  for  equilibrium  exchange  rate 
calculations, so that the prescriptive claims have been treated with caution. 
Eastern  Europe‘s  experience  offers  an  interesting  picture.  First,  current 
account dynamics in Eastern Europe before 2008 construct a picture of vulnerability 
similar to East Asia before its 1997 crisis, combining real exchange rate appreciations 
with increasingly large current account deficits (Grenville, 2008). Furthermore, the 
distinguishing feature of the pre-Lehman era is linked to the internationalization of   19 
banking activity. A bank-based Guidotti-Greenspan ratio, capturing the relationship 
between foreign reserves and short-term foreign liabilities to BIS banks, presents a 
stark contrast between emerging Asian and Eastern Europe (see Figure 3). Whereas 
emerging Asia shows comfortable levels, in Eastern Europe‘s case, the bank-based 
Guidotti-Greenspan ratio neatly reveals the increased exposure to cross-border, short-
term bank borrowing. Three of the four countries with the ratio below unity in the 
run-up to Lehman bankruptcy (Romania, Hungary and Latvia) were forced to require 
IMF assistance during the region‘s subprime moment. The improvement since 2009 
reflects  the  contraction  in  short-term  liabilities  triggered  by  the  post-Lehman 
deleveraging. 
 




Source: data from Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-WB External Debt Hub 
 
The deterioration of bank-based Guidotti-Greenspan ratios in Eastern Europe has two 
interpretations. On the one hand, it could signal greater confidence among central 
banks that the strategy of embracing financial globalization would guarantee access to   20 
international capital markets. Yet the pattern of reserve accumulation suggests that 
central banks retained precautionary concerns: Romania, Bulgaria or Latvia increased 
their reserves by an average of 5 per cent of GDP between 2004 and 2007 (while 
running current account deficits above 10 per cent of GDP). A second interpretation is 
then that reserve accumulation could not keep pace with the fast increase in cross-
border loans to banking sector. As Figure 4 suggests, cross border loans to banking 
sectors in the region increased rapidly
2, in contrast to  East Asian countries where 
regulatory measures aimed to restrict the bulk of bank -intermediated capital inflows 
to funding corporate hedging against US dollar volatility
3 (McCauley, 2008). The 
large share of foreign ownership allowed emerging Europe‘s banking sector to tap 
either mother banks (Aydin, 2008) or increasingly liquid repo markets in Western 
Europe  (Gabor,  2010),  shedding  the  constraints  of  domestic  deposit  activity.  The 
short-term  nature  of  such  sources  of  financing  shifted  the  maturity  structure  of 
external  debt  towards shorter maturities.  This  picture fits  well with  Shin‘s (2010) 
observation that excessive bank asset growth during boom periods goes hand in hand 
with increasing reliance on volatile sources of funding (in this case wholesale funding 
from  abroad) and with  the policy lessons  of the 1997 Asian crisis: private sector 
exposure  to  foreign-currency  loans  financed  by  cross-border  borrowing  increases 
vulnerability to reversals in liquidity cycles (McCauley, 2008).   21 
Figure 4 Cross-border loans to the banking sector, % of GDP 
 
Source: data from Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-WB External Debt Hub 
 
Furthermore, reserves accumulation triggers changes in the liquidity conditions on 
domestic money markets, facing central banks with an additional challenge: how to 
rein  in  domestic  liquidity  and  to  what  extent  could  policy  responses  stimulate 
additional capital inflows? 
 
3.4 Step 4: How much to sterilize? 
Ostry et al. (2010) list three limits to sterilization: depth of fixed-income markets, 
fiscal costs for the central bank and the potential for perpetuating capital inflows. This 
last  consideration  is  important  because  it  points  to  unintended  policy  outcomes: 
sterilizations can perversely increase vulnerability to global liquidity cycles (Calvo, 
1991). An apparently successful sterilization might raise domestic interest rates and 
stimulate even greater capital inflows of shorter maturity, for some the story of the 
1997 East Asian crisis (Montiel and Reinhart, 1999).    22 
Sterilizations became a common response to capital inflows during the 1980s 
and  1990s  dominance  of  money  supply  targeting  strategies  (Caballero  and 
Krishnamurthy,  2001).  In  this  policy  framework,  currency  interventions  increase 
money market liquidity and thus the reserves commercial banks can use for lending. 
While  central  banks  offer  an  automatic  mechanism  for  disposing  of  these  excess 
reserves – the overnight deposit facility – in practice this allows commercial banks 
discretion over how much to hold in reserves and impairs policy control of money 
supply. Sterilizations (direct interventions on money markets) in turn offer central 
banks an active instrument for influencing commercial bank reserves, so that money 
supply control can be achieved independently of exchange rate strategies. Similarly, 
under inflation targeting regimes,  the transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
depends on the central bank‘s ability to influence short-term money market interest 
rates by closely reining in money market liquidity. In both monetarist and inflation 
targeting  narratives,  excess  liquidity  hampers  central  bank‘s  ability  to  contain 
overheating by slowing credit growth and thus endangers its price stability objective. 
Both  accounts  thus  conceptualize  the  banking  sector  in  its  traditional  financial 
intermediation role. Yet once banks‘ activities in money and currency markets are 
considered, it becomes clear that the effects of sterilizations are not entirely reducible 
to the credit market. The relevance for capital account management can be traced by 
considering the interactions between strategies of sterilization, money market liquidity 
and short-term capital inflows. 
 
Before the crisis: carry trades and domestic liquidity 
Before  the  2008  crisis,  central  banks  in  Eastern  Europe  implemented  strategies 
common  to  developing  countries,  ranging  from  open  market  operations  with   23 
government  bonds,  issuing  central  bank  debt,  direct  borrowing  from  the  money 
market or currency swaps (Mohanty and Turner, 2005; Gabor, 2010). The choice of 
strategy typically depends on the scale of sovereign bond markets (McCauley, 2008). 
Where sterilization volumes outpaced existing sovereign debt instruments, as in most 
emerging Asia (Turner, 2008), central banks issued own debt
4 (Hungary, Poland) or 
resorted to taking deposits from commercial banks (Romania), overwhelmingly short-
term
5. The effectiveness of sterilizations operations was partial, leaving a structural 
excess of liquidity across money markets in the region (Balogh, 2009). 
The choice of instruments and maturities has consequences for capital account 
dynamics. Ooi (2008) used Malaysia‘s experience to argue that the most effective 
strategy  is  to  issue  long-term  paper  to  the  non-banking  sector,  in  other  words  to 
circumvent the typical counterparties to sterilization operations, commercial banks.  
The focus on maturity and counterparty highlights the changing role of commercial 
banks,  no  longer  passive  respondents  to  central  bank  operations  but  active 
intermediaries of capital inflows. Indeed, commercial banks in Eastern Europe used 
sterilizations as carry trade vehicles (Christensen, 2004; Gabor, 2010), exchanging 
foreign currency borrowed in international wholesale markets for domestic liquidity 
and  placing  that  liquidity  in  sterilization  instruments.  Given  these  considerations, 
what explains central banks‘ preference for short-term instruments, in Eastern Europe 
and across most developing countries (Hawkins, 2004)?  
There are two possible answers to this question. The explanation preferred by 
central  banks  stresses  institutional  improvements:  efforts  to  align  liquidity 
management with  New  Consensus  theoretical  foundations  and practices of central 
banks in high income countries required the use of short-term instruments. However, 
a second explanation points to the importance of capital flows in assisting central   24 
banks with the price stability objective. If the credit channel is impaired (credit is not 
predictably  responsive  to  central  bank‘s  interest  rate  decisions)  the  disinflation 
strategy relies on exchange rate appreciations, and sterilizations become a vehicle for 
indirect currency manipulation. In other words, short-term, partial sterilizations before 
the 2008 crisis reflected an explicit policy choice, allowing central banks to vary the 
volume  of  liquidity  sterilized  depending  on  its  projections  for  inflation  and  the 
exchange rates path consistent with the target. Thus sterilizations have consequences 
for  currency  movements  both  through  banks‘  direct  participation  in  sterilization 
operations and through dynamics on the non-resident segment. Indeed, commercial 
banks‘ liquidity is  important  for non-resident  carry trade activities:  banks  provide 
loans in funding currency and deposits in target currency or act as counterparts in 
derivative operations (Galati et al, 2007). Thus, the increasing importance of non-
resident  short-term  derivative  trading  in  emerging  markets,  documented  earlier,  is 
intimately linked to central banks‘ management of domestic money market liquidity.  
Theoretically,  non-resident  interest  signals  improved  confidence,  providing 
additional  investment  funding  and/or  enabling  governments  to  reduce  exposure  to 
currency mismatches by borrowing in domestic currency. In practice however, non-
resident interest tends to focus on sovereign debt markets (Pomerleano, 2010). Indeed, 
non-resident holdings of sovereign debt increased in both Eastern Europe and Asia 
before the crisis, and then reverted rapidly with deleveraging pressures in 2008 (figure 
5). The features of domestic debt markets and regulatory space (very limited in EE) 
accounted  for  intra-region  variations.  The  rapid  rise  in  Hungary  reflected  a  fast 
growing public debt, while a low interest rates environment in the Czech Republic 
translated into a relatively subdued carry-trade interest. In contrast, Romania‘s low 
levels of public debt contributed to relatively small non-resident holdings.    25 
 
Figure 5 Debt securities held by non-residents, as % of GDP 
 
source: data from Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-WB External Debt Hub 
 
In  comparison,  growth  in  Asian  countries  reflected  a  broader  set  of  regulatory 
attitudes towards non-resident participation in fixed income segments. Singapore‘s 
high share reflected concerted efforts to grow liquid bond markets and repo markets 
that would offer direct  access  to  funding rather than through bank intermediation 
(Lian, 2002), again a signal of policy control with the role of banks in intermediating 
capital  inflows.  In  contrast,  Thailand‘s  policies  sought  to  curb  non-resident 
participation. Throughout 2006, while non-resident investment in fixed-income, short-
term instruments strengthened the Baht, the central bank first sought to reduce the 
domestic  financial  institutions‘  involvement  with  non-residents  in  very  short-term 
operations  through  moral  suasion  and  then  imposed  unremunerated  reserve 
requirements  on  inflows  into  the  bond  market,  lifted  in  2008  (Thaicharoen  and 
Ananchotikul, 2008). Indonesia similarly considered extending the withholding tax on 
government securities to central bank sterilization instruments (McCauley, 2008). In   26 
2010,  concerns  with  the  rapid  increase  in  non-resident  holding  of  sovereign  debt 
instruments  prompted Thailand to  impose a 15 per cent  withholding tax  on these 
instruments.   
Yet  a  withholding  tax  might  not  be  very  effective.  Controls  on  direct 
purchases  can  be  circumvented  by  leveraged  positions  through  over-the-counter 
derivatives such as currency and interest rate swaps, markets that have seen a strong 
growth in Asia (see Table 1). Taxation or liquidity constraints might shift investors‘ 
preferences from outright purchases of local currency debt instruments to derivatives 
(McCauley,  2008).  Where  non-resident  investors  do  not  have  direct  access  to 
domestic money markets or secondary bond markets are illiquid, derivative positions 
can be funded by rolling over loans in domestic currency. In these instances, domestic 
banks  willingness  to  provide  counterparty  liquidity  (depending  on  central  banks‘ 
liquidity management decisions) plays an important role in the magnitude of non-
resident‘s positions.  
Thus, the capital controls adopted in Asia to contain inflows in fixed income 
markets reflected precisely the vulnerabilities produced by the relationship between 
banks and non-resident carry at play in Eastern Europe. In Eastern Europe, central 
banks‘  limited  effectiveness  to  rein  in  domestic  liquidity  also  implied  limited 
effectiveness to contain commercial banks‘ intermediation of non-resident inflows.  
The  consequences  of  limited  policy  control  over  banks‘  involvement  on 
money markets come into sharper focus during downturns in global capital cycles. In 
an optimistic interpretation, banks‘ liquidity cushions could act as a buffer against 
funding uncertainties, increasing banks‘ resilience to liquidity shocks (Turner, 2008). 
A more concerning scenario is where large liquidity reserves allow commercial banks 
to fund speculative attack on currency markets (Cotarelli et al., 2003). October 2008   27 
provided the context  for  exploring the implications  of banks‘ hybrid activities,  to 
which the paper turns next in a comparative analysis of Romania and Hungary. 
 
During the crisis: coping in the subprime region   
Before 2008, liquidity management strategies were similar in Romania and Hungary. 
Central  banks‘  operations  focused  on  mopping  money  market  liquidity,  through 
central bank instruments in Hungary and deposit taking operations in Romania, at 
similar, short-term maturities (one week). Overnight money market rates often fell 
below the deposit facility rate, indicating a structural excess of liquidity (see Figures 6 
and 7). The initial effects of the September 2008 crisis were also similar: unwinding 
non-resident  carry  positions  produced  severe  pressures  in  currency  markets  and 
increased  tensions  in  interbank  markets.  However,  central  banks  interpreted 
differently the rise in money market rates, a difference of interpretation that triggered 
divergent policy responses.  
   In Hungary, the central bank viewed domestic tensions as a manifestation of 
the  extreme  stress  in  international  financial  markets.  The  stress  translated  into 
uncertainties about counterparty risk, prompting banks to park excess reserves with 
the central bank rather than lend on money markets. Its immediate response echoed 
measures  taken  in  high  income  countries:  large  liquidity  injections  through  repo 
operations or purchases of government debt (quantitative easing) and overnight swap 
facilities to calm market pressures (Balogh, 2009). In contrast, the Romanian central 
bank  interpreted  shortages  in  the  interbank  market  as  evidence  that  banks  were 
hoarding liquidity with the intention of speculating directly or supporting non-resident 
short positions in currency markets (Gabor, 2010). Financial press reports confirmed   28 
that several central banks in the region (Ukraine, Russia, Poland, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic) took a similar view at some point throughout that period (Kaminska, 2009).  
After the initial shock, the international crisis created opportunities for central 
banks to reconsider their strategies of liquidity management in relationship to capital 
flows.  The  Hungarian  central  bank  chose  continuity:  it  returned  to  accumulating 
foreign reserves (initially by exchanging government‘s foreign loans) and a threefold 
increase  in  the  magnitude  of  sterilization  operations  by  2011.  Commercial  banks 
switched  from  the  deposit  facility,  resuming  direct  carry  trades  and  counterparty 
activity with non-residents (Balogh, 2009). Thus interest rate cuts were accompanied 
by increased non-resident demand for HUF-denominated assets (IMF, 2009). Looser 
domestic  financial  conditions  further  improved  financing  conditions  for  the 
government, driving sovereign yields across the maturity spectrum below the policy 
rate.  This  also  helped  overcome  the  stress  in  money  markets  produced  by  the 
Eurozone sovereign debt pressures and the uncertainty associated with governmental 
elections  in  May  2010.  By  the  end  of  2010,  money  markets  were  flushed  with 
liquidity: interbank rates trailed below the level at which commercial banks could 
deposit excess reserves at the central bank (the deposit facility).    29 
 
 
Source: data from National Bank of Hungary  
 
In contrast, the Romanian central bank chose radical change. Throughout 2009, it 
sought to increase policy control over money markets by severing the link between 
capital inflows and money market liquidity. 
In money markets, the uncertainty triggered by moments of crisis typically 
translates into a high liquidity preference. This is why the central bank‘s commitment 
to  provide  emergency  liquidity  restores  a  normal  functioning  and  minimizes 
counterparty risk. Instead, the Romanian central bank cemented uncertainty further by 
suspending active money market interventions. Before April 2009, all new liquidity 
on money markets came from either currency swaps (central bank would temporarily 
provide domestic liquidity in exchange for foreign currencies) or through the central 
bank lending facility. This functioned as an implicit signal for commercial banks with 
Figure 6  Liquidity management instruments and money market interest rates, Hungary, 2007-2010   30 
excess liquidity to maintain ‗safety cushions‘. It further forced banks with liquidity 
shortages to borrow directly from the central bank, at high interest rates and against 
collateral.  Recourse  to  the  lending  facility  rose  dramatically  (see  figure  7). 
Commercial banks borrowed around EUR 10bn in both January and February 2009, at 
above 15% interest rate. Such expensive domestic liquidity effectively curtailed the 
scope  for  commercial  banks  to  engage  with  non-residents  carry  trade  activity. 
However, it posed severe difficulties for sovereign debt management. Uncertainty on 
money  markets  produced  shorter  time  horizons  on  bond  markets.  Without  central 
bank support, the government found it increasingly difficult to finance its operations: 
by March 2009 only 35 per cent of new debt was contracted at maturities longer than 
three months. With little access to foreign borrowing, it turned to the IMF. 
 
 
   
Source: data from National Bank of Romania  
Figure 7 Liquidity management strategies, Romania, 2007-2010   31 
 
The combination of IMF‘s endorsement of crisis policies, restored global liquidity and 
the signing of the Vienna agreement committing Western Europe‘s commercial banks 
to roll-over credit to Eastern subsidiaries modified the central bank‘s perceptions of 
speculative pressures. After April 2009, it returned to money markets with small scale 
sterilization operations at varying maturities and liquidity injections (an indirect form 
of quantitative easing, offering commercial banks liquidity to purchase government 
debt). Access to the lending facility reduced considerably. Yet crucially, even if these 
measures  were  successful  in  reducing  money  market  volatility,  the  central  bank 
maintained  its  reluctance  to  allow  capital  inflows  to  influence  domestic  liquidity 
conditions,  triggering  commercial  bank  complaints  that  it  was  tightening  money 
market liquidity to limit currency trading (Gabor, 2010). Furthermore, attempts to rein 
in  money  market  liquidity  reinforced  government‘s  difficulties  on  bond  markets. 
While  Hungary‘s  success  in  harnessing  the  improved  international  risk  appetite 
translated in a bond rally throughout October 2009, the Romanian government was 
rejecting bids because the yields demanded exceeded the central bank‘s policy rate. 
This strategy towards capital account management changed in January 2010. 
The central bank reinstated the link between domestic liquidity and capital inflows, 
when, as Hungary in 2009, it injected large volumes of liquidity by acting as the 
official  exchange  agent  for  government‘s  foreign  loans.  Money  market  liquidity 
increased dramatically, a signal of increased flows into currency markets and non-
resident activity: by April 2010 (incidentally the month of the BIS Triennial Survey), 
commercial banks deposited around EUR 20 bn at the discount facility. Sterilizations 
increased  in  both  magnitude  and  frequency  (although  nowhere  near  Hungary‘s   32 
expansion), and interest rates on money markets realigned to patterns prevalent in 
Hungry.  
What explains the Romanian central bank‘s decision to return to the old rules 
of the game (as in Hungary) after a year of experimenting with measures to rein in 
domestic liquidity? Two possible explanations arise. The first relates to how central 
banks form expectations of speculative threats. As Demir (2009) argued, diversified 
portfolios  in  international  money  markets  increase  the  marginal  cost  of  acquiring 
country specific information. If investors have more incentives to react to news rather 
than to fundamentals, political turmoil can quickly translated into adverse currency 
positions,  leading  central  banks,  as  in  Romania,  to  channel  policy  efforts  into 
preventing speculative pressures. The increasing stabilization of national politics after 
the September 2010 elections thus allowed the central bank to return to ‗normalized‘ 
policy  making.  A  second  explanation  points  the  changes  in  international  political 
economy  triggered  by  sovereign  debt  concerns  in  European  countries.  In  this 
environment,  a  strategy  of  fine-tuning  capital  account  management  could  rapidly 
backfire for countries in Europe‘s periphery. 
 
3.5 Step 5: Fiscal tightening 
Such a complex picture further calls into question the wisdom of relying on fiscal 
rectitude to address destabilizing capital inflows. The politics of spending complicates 
implementation:  a  fiscal  solution  to  overheating  depends  on  the  nature  of  the 
relationship between governments and central banks (Schadler, 2008), while the East 
Asian accumulation of large saving surpluses post-1997 questions the effectiveness of 
fiscal  tightening  (Grenville,  2008).  Furthermore,  unless  the  relationship  between 
sovereign debt markets and investors (domestic banks and non-resident players) is   33 
mediated by a carefully designed coordination between monetary and fiscal policy, 
fiscal tightening alone will have limited effectiveness in altering banks‘ incentives. 
The highly discretionary approach to liquidity management in Romania effectively 
replaced  one  source  of  short-term  returns  (central  bank  sterilization)  with  another 
(sovereign  debt).  Instead,  the  recent  experience  with  unconventional  monetary 
policies in high income countries shows that central banks have effective tools to 
increase the time horizons on bond markets, as Arestis and Sawyer (2004) have long 
argued. 
 
4.  The policy implications: Eastern European lessons  
The Romanian central bank‘s shifts in strategy testify to challenges raised by short-
term  capital  inflows,  particularly  where  banks  intermediate  these.  Policy  efforts 
throughout 2009 effectively amounted to a market-based attempt to select ‗desirable‘ 
capital inflows. However, the central bank‘s refusal to play the ‗carry trade game‘ 
through manipulating money market liquidity had limited effectiveness in selecting 
non-resident investors with longer-term horizons, leaving governments dependent on 
domestic sources of financing (commercial banks). For this reason, the central bank‘s 
strategy  was  ultimately  ineffective  in  realigning  commercial  banks‘  system  of 
incentives towards longer time horizons.  
  The Romanian experiment offers policy lessons to countries where financial 
innovation quickly develops methods to circumvent capital controls. Sterilizations at 
long-term maturities are necessary to position the central bank as a net creditor on the 
overnight money market, and thus allow it to influence domestic liquidity. However, 
changes  in  tactics  of  sterilizations  alone  will  not  suffice.  For  such  policies  to  be 
successful  in  tackling  global  liquidity  cycles,  the  question  is  how  to  realign  the   34 
incentives of banking systems away from short-term pursuit of yield. Measures can 
range from macroprudential policies such as Shin‘s (2010) levy on banks‘ non-core 
liabilities (i.e. wholesale funding) to more radical ideas such as Grenville‘s (2008) 
advocacy  of  narrow  banks  whose  remit  would  be  limited  to  holding  government 
securities as  assets and  would take domestic deposits  as  liabilities. Narrow banks 
would  contain  the  scope  for  yield  pursuit  in  domestic  bond  markets,  and  instead 
refocus the rest of the banking sector on providing long-term finance to production.  
Thus a combination of carefully design  central  bank liquidity strategies and 
institutional changes in the banking sector would provide developing countries with a 
set of powerful tools to rethink development strategies away from what Grabel (1995) 
aptly termed speculation-led economic development. The IMF‘s search for a coherent 
view on capital account management will succeed if it acknowledges the desirability 
of shifting to investment-led growth models and a cautious attitude towards financial 
globalisation, a position forcefully articulated by UNCTAD (2009).  
 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper raised several questions related to policy room for manoeuvre in countries 
that do not influence, but are heavily exposed to global liquidity cycles. It argued that 
this is an important issue for developing countries because financial globalization has 
redefined policy challenges: capital flows,  and no longer trade relationships, have 
become the key conduit for the transmission of global shocks. To understand policy 
options  for  developing  countries,  it  is  necessary  to  introduce  in  policy  debates 
conceptual  domains  previously  confined  to  finance  and  macroeconomics. 
Understanding what  central  banks  do, their relationship with  currency  and money 
markets becomes crucial for developing policy alternatives that reduce vulnerability   35 
to  capital  flows.  The  changing  nature  of  financial  intermediation  requires  further 
theoretical  and  policy  reflection  on  how  global  liquidity,  actors  and  strategies  of 
currency trading interact and contribute to the creation of global vulnerabilities. The 
paper argued that Eastern Europe offers developing countries a fertile terrain for such 
reflection because of an increasing convergence in patterns of currency trading across 
emerging markets. 
The shifting mood towards large capital inflows, well captured by the IMF‘s 
recent endorsement of capital controls, recognizes the demise of the old conceptual 
apparatus that posits the optimality of free capital flows  and is dominated by the 
uncovered  interest  parity  to  explain  away  the  possibility  of  sustained  speculative 
returns. Yet the advances are timid: the IMF‘s steps-approach to  addressing large 
capital inflows offers a formulaic solution that neglects the institutional make-up of 
money  and currency markets,  is  asymmetric in its  emphasis  on  the upturn of the 
liquidity  cycle  and  sanctions  capital-controls  only  as  a  last-resort  solution.  The 
Eastern European experience with fully liberalized capital accounts suggests that the 
advocated  method  of  prioritizing  policy  responses  during  the  upturn  can  have 
perverse  impacts,  worsening  exposure  particularly  where  yield  differentials  are 
substantial and banking activity is increasingly hybrid, from counterparties to carry 
trade activity to arbitraging differentials between local and foreign currency loans 
through  wholesale  funding  abroad.  The  loss  of  policy  autonomy  questions  the 
effectiveness of inflation targeting regimes, with or without asset prices incorporated 
in  the  policy  rule,  to  contain  foreign-financed  asset  bubbles  or  indeed  demand 
pressures. 
Regional responses to global liquidity cycles offered an interesting experiment 
with market-based forms of selecting desirable inflows. The Romanian central bank   36 
attempted to tighten the grip on money markets by severing the link between capital 
inflows and domestic liquidity, contrary to the IMF‘s recommended strategy. This 
strategy failed because it did not go far enough in seeking to reorient banking activity 
towards supporting an investment-led growth model. It thus revealed that the success 
of strategies towards capital inflows crucially depends on a holistic view of economic 
management  that  seeks  to  coordinate  central  bank  liquidity  strategies  with 
institutional changes in banking and well-defined, investment led growth strategies. 
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Notes  
                                                 
1
 This theoretical perspective has been used to explain what Fabrizio et al. (2009) described 
as emerging Europe‘s benign tolerance towards the sustained real appreciation before 2008: 
policy makers across different exchange rate regimes identified currency strengthening as part 
of  the  equilibrium  process  driven  by  fast  productivity  gains  in  the  run-up  and  after  EU 
membership. 
2
 The only exception, the Czech Republic, was partly explained by the availability of cheap 
liquidity on the domestic interbank market and low yield differentials. 
3 China sought to contain the growth of dollar-denominated asset markets by extending to 
foreign banks the prohibition of cross-border funding in dollars in 2008. Korea similarly 
imposed restrictions on foreign banks‘ cross-border financing in April 2007 
4 Turner (2008) describes a similar experience in East Asian countries since 2002. Bank of 
Thailand sterilization bonds saw a sevenfold increase between 2003 and 2007, whereas Bank 
of Korea‘s monetary stabilization bonds saw a three fold increase.  
5The Polish central bank (NBP) used one-week NBP bills to absorb liquidity, similar to 
Hungary‘s two-week central bank (MNB) bills. The Czech Republic deployed repo tenders 
with a two week maturity, and occasional shorter-maturity repo tenders depending on the 
forecasted liquidity positions. The Romanian central bank preferred direct loans from the 
money markets (deposit taking operations with maturities varying from one month to seven 
days) complemented with occasional reverse repos and issuance of certificate of deposits. 